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Scholars of Chinese cities agree on the centrality of the local state inthe urban process over the past few decades. (1) Given the continuityof the state-socialist legacy in the land system and political gover-
nance, local states take the lead in land expropriation, clean-sweep re-de-
velopment, eviction, and even resettlement of residents. While the “state-led
urbanisation” argument correctly draws attention to state power, the active
role of society needs to be taken into account. (2) Others highlight localities,
including local state and rural communities, as an institutional arrangement
providing incentives and support to industrial and urban growth. (3) Although
it is very likely that local state corporatism may foster economic growth
and urbanisation, it is not clear that the converse is true. The conflict and
separation between local state power and local society are noteworthy. (4)
The objective of this article is to provide a politico-economic account of
the multiple forms of collectivities, including the communal land system,
local clanship, and territories of folk religion, and their contribution to ur-
banisation in the Pearl River Delta (PRD).
In this article, “urbanisation,” rather than a simple aggregation of popula-
tion and economic activities or conversion of an administrative village into
a residential community (cungaiju), is an “urban process” in the political
economic sense. This study, following yet modifying the critical approaches
of urban sociology, sees the “urban process” of the Pearl River Delta region
as the social reorganisation of and contestation over “the collective” in the
capitalist socio-spatial relations of production. (5) Peri-urbanisation at the
village level is seen less as a functional outcome of capital logic than as an
emergent and relationally “over-determined geography of dispossession and
possibility.” (6) In other words, while local states undergo urbanisation by ac-
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ABSTRACT: While the “state-led urbanisation” argument highlights the dominance of state power in China’s urban process, the notion
of “local state/village corporatism” pays attention to the significant stake of local governments and their rural collectivities in econo-
mic development and urban growth, especially in the region of Guangdong’s Pearl River Delta. Yet, these two arguments overlook the
multiple forms of collectivities, including the communal land system, local clanship, and territories of folk religion, and their partici-
pation in the urban process. This article adopts a more structural approach by seeing the “urban process” as the socio-spatial reorga-
nisation of and struggle over “the collective” in the capitalist socio-spatial relations of production. With the ethnographic study of Vil-
lage Z in Dongguan, I argue that proletarianisation is not simply an integral part of the urban process but also the background against
which communal imagination and the cellular form of activism take their shapes. Local collectivities do not necessarily share the in-
terests and values of the developmental states but counteract the local states at all levels, thereby perpetuating contestation over
urban spaces.
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tively mobilising their resources to re-define, expand, and consolidate their
urban territory and economic functions, other social actors also consciously
engage in struggles over physical and imagined territories. (7) These state and
non-state agents interact with one another in constituting the socio-spatial
dynamic, i.e., the “over-determined geography.” This not only results in capital
accumulation in a new urban setting by dispossession of peasant’s collective
property, but also constitutes the new conditions for new communal imag-
inary and practice. In this study of the fringe of the metropolitan region of
the PRD, I argue that the dynamic between class restructuring, communal
imagination, and the cellular form of activism is an integral part of the state-
led urban process in Guangdong. This process is not simply a conflict of in-
terests between the predatory state and the populace. Indeed, both find their
own agency, albeit in opposite directions, in the capitalist urban process. Vil-
lage cadres, in collaboration with township and city governments, play the
roles of landlord, broker, planner, and builder, alienating themselves from vil-
lage life and exerting their power over the community from afar. Most vil-
lagers, with a heightened awareness that mastery of their individual as well
as community lives is almost impossible, are besieged by state-sponsored
urbanisation and capitalist development. Their resistance against proletari-
anisation runs parallel to reclaiming entitlement to their home territory. 
The data presented here are drawn mainly from intensive fieldwork and
ethnography conducted from 2005 to 2007 in Village Z of Dongguan, an
industrial region of the PRD known as “the factory of the world,” with some
follow-up work continuing into 2013. Apart from in-depth interviews with
20 villagers, including ordinary villagers, entrepreneurs, and cadres, and
countless casual chats, I participated in villagers’ festive celebrations, wed-
ding banquets, lion dance competitions, and an election day assembly. (8)
In this article, I firstly outline the urban context and path of Village Z. I
then move on to analyse the restructuring process of class relations with a
focus on proletarianisation and the rise of power elites over the past three
decades. Against this background, communal imagination and practices
have become prolific, especially in local resistance against state-led projects
of urbanisation and in electoral struggles. The conclusion discusses its im-
plications for understanding contested urban spaces in contemporary China.
Urbanising the Pearl River Delta
Dongguan, the southern tip of Guangdong Province and the south-eastern
portion of the PRD, was known as the home town of emigrants to Hong
Kong as early as the Mao era. Its rapid industrialisation since the early 1980s
was first perpetuated by the return of overseas Chinese running factories
for contract manufacturing in Hong Kong as well as Taiwan. In the late
1990s, the export volume of its joint ventures and foreign companies was
already the second largest in the PRD, and it was called one of the “Four
Tigers of Guangdong” (Dongguan, Nanhai, Shunde, and Panyu). (9)
Over the past three decades, despite a huge influx of capital and labour,
population growth in Dongguan has been so moderate that the local com-
munity has been shrinking in the demographic sense. According to official
statistics, the number of migrant labourers in Dongguan has outnumbered
the local population since the late 1990s, reaching 3.95 million in 2011
compared with 1.85 million local residents. (10) Another dramatic change oc-
curring in local society is the rapid reduction of arable land, from 1.18 mil-
lion acres in 1978 to 0.58 million acres in 2010. (11) Collective ownership
and agricultural use of land has quickly given way to urban and industrial
land use under state ownership over the past three decades. 
Yet, the schematic model of modernisation fails to capture the social com-
plexity of this rapid process. While I agree with some scholars on the relative
popularity of the corporatist model of Guangdong’s urbanisation, in which
rural collectivities have a significant stake in urban and economic develop-
ment, (12) I doubt that it is the general rule even within the PRD region. My
case study offers a different story, featuring class polarisation, social conflict,
and moral tension, and reveals dimensions of the urban process neglected
by previous research. While some villagers had accumulated wealth and
were happy with their new urban way of life, most shared an ambiguous
feeling of loss as well as a strong sense of deprivation in the process of pro-
letarianisation. This is also the first impression I gained from my fieldwork
in 2005, when the land dispute was still going on in Village Z, an adminis-
trative village community with an area of 3.2 square kilometres in Town-
ship S, on the northern fringe of Dongguan City. (13) Although the
administration categorises the village as “rural,” its urban nature dates back
to the late 1980s, when industrialisation, land expropriation, and proletari-
anisation were firstly triggered. Its path of socio-spatial development has
long been a part as well as an example of the great urban transformation
of the PRD region.
Village Z: New industrial society
Village Z was an administrative village (xingzhengcun), equivalent to a
production brigade in the Mao era, comprising 11 village groups (cunmin
xiaozu) or production teams (shengchandui). Its population composition re-
mained simple until export-led manufacturing brought in a large number
of rural migrant workers from other provinces in the late 1980s. From 1999
to 2011, the local population of Village Z grew by only 13% to 2,308, while
the temporary migrant population reached 3,585 at a growth rate of 74%.
According to local villagers and cadres, official censuses seriously underes-
timated the number of migrant workers. On the one hand, the demographic
change eventually resulted in a growing sense of threat and loss among vil-
lagers. On the other hand, locals maintained a strong status distinction from
migrant workers in terms of household registration, occupation, customs,
and way of life, as demonstrated by patterns of land use and neighbourhood
segregation. After economic reform, villagers gradually moved out of their
old villages to build new homes in a new residential area on either side of
a highway. The old pre-Deng era buildings were largely rented out to migrant
workers. To the northeast and the southwest of the local neighbourhood,
i.e., the old village and new residential area, was the massive construction
of factories and worker dormitories, along with large pieces of empty land
expropriated by local cadres for future development. Local people retreated
from most of their former territories to their turf located right at the centre
of the village (see Map 1).
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In recent years, very few residents have been proud of their village’s eco-
nomic development. At first sight, this is a grievance over economic well-
being. It is true that compared to the highly industrialised districts of
Dongguan, such as the villages of Changan Town and Humen Town, Town-
ship S and Village Z failed to build up a solid economic base. Yet villagers’
inferiority complex was not the major source of their frustration. As some
residents observed, only factory owners, developers, and local cadres were
able to take advantage of economic opportunities and their land to accu-
mulate wealth. Villagers gradually realised that what market reform gave
ordinary residents was a false hope or an impossible dream of achieving in-
dividual success in a money economy. Instead of jumping on the bandwagon
of state-sponsored capitalism, they had the fate of proletarianisation thrust
upon them, losing the land that was their means of subsistence and pro-
duction. This is also the politico-economic background against which vil-
lagers looked for and revisited their collective identities.
The village as a class society
The socio-economic effects of China’s market reforms in the 1980s have
been a hot topic among researchers of socialist countries. Victor Nee’s ar-
gument that direct producers rather than cadres benefited from market
transition was challenged by those who emphasised the factors of lingering
institutional mediation and paths of market penetration. (14) These factors,
as Ivan Szelenyi and Eric Kostello pointed out in their scrutiny of various so-
cialist and post-socialist countries, (15) have become more crucial in deter-
mining the allocation of resources in the latter phase of economic reform
and in particular economic sectors such as land transactions and the pri-
vatisation of state-owned property. In the case of China’s economic reform,
the wealth-equalising effect caused by the rise of local markets for agricul-
tural products in the late 1970s and early 1980s has been gradually neu-
tralised by industrialisation and urbanisation since the 1990s. There followed
a thriving literature that specified the sectoral mechanisms of market cre-
ation out of state and collective property rights, and their implications for
social stratification. (16) In this light, this paper focuses on the impact of this
dramatic shift in market reform on the class experience, social relations,
and communal politics of Village Z.  
Lost in market transition
Some villagers aged over 50 still vividly remembered the golden years of
agricultural reform when they firstly enjoyed good harvests and freedom in
production and market exchange. Huang Xiong, aged 60, felt very proud of
the economic achievements of the early 80s:
The early 1980s was the first time for me to have so much grain at
home. Villagers’ homes were not big enough to store it all. Everyone
worked very hard. We harvested 600-800 catties per mu while the
average in the past was merely 500 catties. The system of work
points and restrictions on grain distribution were cancelled. We ate
as much as we wanted. Indeed, the harvest was much more than our
subsistence needs. The market price for grain was good, too. Our cash
revenue increased a lot. The land of our village was almost the best
in Dongguan. That was another reason for our good harvests.
His memory of the early phase of economic reform contrasts with his ex-
perience as a peasant in the Mao era of collectivisation. His personal story
is a small part of the whole picture of China’s rural economy featuring decol-
lectivisation and price reform from 1979 to 1984. The annual growth rate
of agricultural product value reached 7.7%. (17)
Yet after the mid-1980s, the dramatic growth of the rural economy gave
way to sluggish development with the shrinking effect of decollectivisation
and price reform. The village committee and Party branch secretary of Vil-
lage Z began taking over management of the land and encouraged villagers
to quit agricultural production, intending to develop the land for industrial
and commercial purposes in the future. In return, each villager was entitled
to an annual payment of 500-1,000 yuan. Most villagers admitted that
they did not have much objection to it at that time because they had
placed high expectations in other businesses. Huang Qiang is an example.
In 1990, Qiang, a young man of 27, was happy to lay down the burden of
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agriculture and joined the rising industry of sand mining triggered by mas-
sive construction projects in the PRD. However, his business could not sur-
vive cut-throat competition from many other villagers like him. A few years
later he returned to the village to work as a security guard and tractor
driver. 
In the 1990s, we could drive a tractor to deliver goods to customers.
At that time, many people were building houses, and demand for
transportation of construction materials such as brick, rock, and sand
was huge. I earned 10,000-30,000 yuan per year. During 1994-1995,
the township government suddenly revoked our licenses. Two years
later, tractors were banned from the main roads. Violations were sub-
ject to heavy fines. We could only drive within the village, and deliv-
eries were almost impossible.
Since then, Qiang has made a living from fishery and pig farming. Yet, in
2005, when I paid a visit to his home, he looked rather grim and nervous.
He was worried about his livelihood again because the township govern-
ment was launching a “Four Clean-ups” campaign (siqingli) to end all kinds
of farming. At the age of 42, Huang Qiang had no option other than to look
for a job as a security guard for a factory or on the security team of the vil-
lage committee. 
Instead of generating income from their land, some villagers were lucky
enough to make a living, rather than gain much wealth, from renting out
their surplus apartments to migrant workers. But the property market of
Village Z was not as strong as that of the more prosperous regions of the
PRD. Since the mid-1990s, some villagers have worked as self-employed
cargo drivers who provide services for small factories and workshops. Huang
Zhi, aged 36, was better-off than Qiang, earning a monthly income of 2,000-
3,000 yuan with his cargo van. To sustain a successful business and cover
the rising cost of gasoline, license fees, and tolls, especially during the years
when Dongguan’s manufacturing sector was shrinking, Zhi worked very hard
and barely had time for his family. 
The shift of market penetration has had an enormous impact on vil-
lagers’ livelihood. Although the local market of crops and other sideline
products in the early 1980s enabled most peasants to enjoy economic
well-being, it failed to continue providing sufficient incentives for the
growth of the rural economy after the mid-1980s. The capitalist path of
development since the early 1990s, characteristic of industrialisation and
urbanisation, deprived villagers of land use and gradually eliminated space
for husbandry, fisheries, and informal economy. This process resulted in
higher economic inequality, to the detriment of most ordinary villagers,
particularly small traders and self-employed workers who had no strong
ties with local cadres. 
The rise of local power elites
The dramatic shift of market penetration from local and agricultural mar-
ket to industrial capital and land development since the 1990s has meant
something radically different to a handful of village elites. Since the early
1980s, a large number of foreign capitalists, usually overseas Chinese, began
to make use of cheap village land to establish and expand their production
sites. And until the late 1990s, the village committee and Party secretary
held enormous power to dispose of collective land without accountability
to those below or much restriction from above. It is an open secret that vil-
lage cadres pocketed compensation for land transactions and development. 
Huang Xingfeng, born in Village Z, emigrated to Hong Kong in the 1950s
and then opened a small rattan manufacturing plant in the 1970s. In 1984,
he moved its production to his home village and was granted a large piece
of land in the north by the village secretary, but without signing any written
contract. This was probably the beginning of the collusion of local power
elites with foreign capital in developing the village’s collective land for in-
dustrial and commercial use. Transactions and even speculation in land in
the PRD were spurred by Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour and his strong en-
dorsement of economic reform in 1992. In the case of Village Z, the whole
area in the north was eventually taken over by enterprise owners, real-estate
developers, and speculators without any substantial compensation to the
village committee. Since then, intense concern over land revenue, develop-
ment, and use and misuse of government power has been endemic among
villagers.
A ring of local state-party elites, including village Party secretary Huang
Ganzhi and his associates, held positions in the village committee since the
early 1970s under the patronage of township Party secretary Tang Binghua,
thereby gaining wealth out of various under-the-table dealings. During the
influx of overseas capital, land development, and speculation, they accu-
mulated initial capital so quickly that they have been expanding their busi-
ness networks in other parts of Dongguan since the mid-1990s. They not
only built rows of luxury villas in a corner of the village, but eventually
moved out of the village, and some even emigrated abroad, although they
exercised power to their own absolute discretion in land-related affairs for
more than 20 years. Despite patron-client relationships in the village and
wealth trickling down to some villagers, these power elites have gradually
lost their mass support since the late 1990s. 
Huang Yingbang was somewhat exceptional among the local elites. In
1979, he built up his small workshop with remittances from his brother-in-
law in the United States. However, rather than from industrial production,
his wealth came largely from smuggling raw materials restricted by the
harsh import quota system in the 1980s. According to a local official in the
township government, this was very common during the early years of eco-
nomic reform, especially in Town S, located near the Dong River, the eastern
tributary of the Pearl River. Despite Yingbang’s involvement in illegal activ-
ities, he was very proud of not profiting from the seizure of collective land
in his home village. And unlike Ganzhi and others, Yingbang lived in the vil-
lage and was deeply concerned about its development. 
Huang Guilin, aged 28, was the manager of Village Z’s electricity station,
a government position passed on to him by his father, who worked there
for 40 years. Guilin, a young man born in the Deng era and growing up
amidst collusion between government and business, never stopped taking
advantage of his privileged position despite villagers’ complaints and gos-
sip. As soon as he took office, he opened a small shop monopolising the
installation of electrical meters. He often bragged about his friendship
with enterprise owners and their respect for him. For instance, Guilin en-
joyed talking about his privilege of parking his vehicle in the lot of
Xingfeng’s plant. Enterprise owners and managers entertained him largely
because of his control over power supply, which was indispensable to their
business. While he tried hard to emulate the village’s nouveaux riches, he
despised ordinary villagers for their parochialism and poverty. As he told
me bluntly, he preferred driving around Dongguan in his Honda Prelude
to socialise with entrepreneurs and officials rather than hanging out with
his fellow villagers.
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Resistance to proletarianisation and
localisation
The stories above confirm the findings of the Chinese local state’s preda-
tory nature. (18) Indeed, the process of class restructuring and differentiation
is the background against which we understand territorial politics at Village
Z. In contrast to the stories of class formation of power elites, the class ex-
perience of ordinary villagers could be termed as proletarianisation, i.e., land-
less people being forced to join the army of wage labour. Yet, most tried
hard to avoid ending up as low-end factory wage-earners, which is why
there were only three factory workers among the 50 villagers I met. 
Proletarianisation is never a process without active or passive resistance.
During the industrial revolution of Europe, small peasants did not join the
ranks of labour unless they were left with no land or other means of sub-
sistence. Farmers and artisans fought against the factory system in the nine-
teenth century. (19) The peasants and indigenous people of colonies refused
to join industrial work because they preferred more leisure to engage in
cash income until subsistence farming was destroyed by colonisation and
heavy taxes levied by colonial authorities. (20) Most local people of Village Z
refused to join the migrant workers for cultural rather than economic rea-
sons. They differentiated themselves from migrant “peasant workers” (min-
gong) to affirm their status, cultural identity, and way of life as “local people”
(bendiren). Generally speaking, they preferred to enjoy more individual au-
tonomy and freedom in work. Wage work, subject to high labour intensity
and discipline in factories, was never regarded by locals as a promising ca-
reer. And most local people, not highly educated and speaking Cantonese
as well as their more localised dialect, were not accustomed to speaking
the Putonghua that was the lingua franca among factory workers of differ-
ent origins. In sum, their resistance to proletarianisation took the shape of
localisation in one way or another.
When I first met Huang Xingxing, aged 25, in 2004, he had just quit his
job in a tyre factory. As a key member of the village’s lion dance team, he
participated in training with other local young people in their new ancestral
hall. He enjoyed talking about lion dancing and hanging out with his friends
rather than his regular job. He showed his frustration whenever he men-
tioned it:
I graduated from high school in 1995. The village committee intro-
duced me to a rattan factory. Then I moved to a tyre factory in Town
F. The work was really tough and 12 hours per shift. I moved and
packaged those heavy and dirty tyres every day. Then I moved to an-
other factory to work as a driver after I got my driver’s license… The
boss’s wife was in charge of everything. She was mean and harsh.
The salary was only 800 yuan per month. I couldn’t take a break at
all. Apart from driving, I had to take care of the machines. The shop
floor was really hot. I was fed up with it and finally quit. It just so
happens that our lion dance team is about to go to Vietnam for a
competition. So I will look for another job after that.
Instead of seeing any prospects in his work, he dreamed of working as a
professional lion dance artist. However, he told me that the birth of his son
called an end to his dream. He understood that he could not rely solely on
his wife, a factory worker, to support family. But he admitted that he always
wanted to take a temporary break from work. In the summer of 2006, the
township government subsidised members of the lion dance team to par-
ticipate in a citywide competition. He immediately quit his job again for
training and preparation.
While Xingxing’s aversion to factory work was widely shared, his occupa-
tion is not typical among local young men. Most I met worked as security
team members hired by the village committee or police officers for the local
public security bureau branch. In 2006, the staff size of security and police
officer reached around 100, an average of one law-enforcement officer per
five households. These officers came from similar backgrounds. They were
not highly educated and some had enlisted in the People’s Liberation Army
when they were around 20. Most veterans were recruited by the village
committee as security officers. Yet the physical strength and combat skills
of these young military veterans might not have been the major consider-
ation. As Huang Bingyan, team leader of the security officers, explained, this
recruitment policy was primarily intended to provide job opportunities for
local people. In fact, although he always complained about the slackness of
local people and preferred to hire non-locals, he was under constant pres-
sure from local families to recruit their sons.
The expansion of the security ranks occurred alongside local people’s feel-
ing of being threatened by migrant workers from outside. The fact that
“temporary residents” outnumbered the local population created a persist-
ent demand for more security forces for the local community. It also rein-
forced a local sense of belonging and a defence mechanism against
outsiders, especially migrant workers. The economic contribution to the vil-
lage economy by workers from inland provinces was never recognised by
locals. Instead, local residents positioned themselves in the role of main-
taining local order and security while migrant workers were always por-
trayed as troublemakers bringing chaos to their home territory. 
Communal imagination and practices in
conflict
In sum, ordinary villagers developed a new sense of place in the midst of
the breakdown of the rural economy, the rise of industrial capitalism, pro-
letarianisation, and desperate attempts to escape from labour discipline. In
other words, the collectivity and locality of this small village should be taken
as a formation as well as a process in which multiple forces of territorisation
and de-territorisation interact with one another. 
In 2005, I was introduced to Village Z by a Township government cadre in
charge of cultural affairs. Huang Jun, Guilin’s father and the vice-director of
the Zhixing Lion Dance Team, was my first local informant. He began his
volunteer work there after his retirement. We met in a big three-storey
building called the “Zhixing Cultural Centre” (see Photo 1), the office and
training site of the team. This was the newest and largest public building in
the village, occupying a piece of land with an area of 6,000 metres in the
north-eastern part of the village, facing southwest. It ran parallel to the vil-
lage’s ancestral hall, a 300-year-old historical building. Jun explained to me
that it functioned as an ancestral hall for the Huang lineage in the past, es-
pecially for the villagers of the East Wing. The name of “Zhixing” also came
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from the original name of their old ancestral hall, Zhixing Hall. When I won-
dered why the cultural centre was even larger than the office building of
the village committee, Jun smiled without explanation. 
Huang Yingbang, a successful local entrepreneur, was the founder and di-
rector of the lion dance team. In the early 1990s, adult villagers were very
irritated by problems of youth delinquency and school dropouts. Yingbang
and some senior villagers came up with the idea of a lion dance team to
recruit and organise the boys. To their surprise, the team made a success
and even won grand prize in a national competition in 1996. The villagers
and even the cadres of the township government were very proud of it. In
1998, they raised some money from a rich fellow villager in Hong Kong for
the construction of the cultural centre. 
This project was a further development for channelling local or overseas
villagers’ newfound wealth from the market economy into building or
restoring sites for community rituals. For Yingbang, despite his involvement
in smuggling in the 1980s, the lion dance team earned him a good reputa-
tion and moral authority that eventually posed a challenge to the crumbling
authority of village cadres. In fact, Yingbang had been in a feud with Ganzhi,
the village Party secretary, since being kicked out of the village leadership
in the late 1970s. It was clear that Yingbang’s cultural centre project was
an attempt to establish a domain and claim a new lineage territory parallel
to the local party-state authority. The centre provided not only a training
ground for the lion dance team, but also office space for village groups in
the East Wing of Village Z. 
In order to contain Yingbang’s endeavour, Ganzhi rejected his request for
a piece of land for the cultural centre. But Ganzhi finally backed down under
pressure from the township government and the donor. Ganzhi responded
by attempting to initiate an even larger project to construct a new village
government building right in front of the cultural centre, perhaps as a phys-
ical demonstration of his power. However, due to the government’s long-
standing financial difficulties, he failed to raise sufficient funding for it. For
various reasons, he left office in 2004 and the construction project was
abandoned. This story sheds light on the process of making a locality. On
the one hand, local elites can manage a new territorial space by revitalising
lineage traditions, solidarity, and networks and getting around the patron-
client relationship dominated by village cadres. On the other, collaboration
with the upper levels of government and the overseas network of fellow
villagers proves a successful strategy for maintaining their autonomy. 
Many teenagers recruited by Yingbang to join the lion dance team in the
late 1990s ended up working as security and police officers. In spite of his
moral power and personal networks, Yingbang did not explicitly present
himself as a competitor for political power in the village. Instead, socio-cul-
tural purposes and religious functions still prevailed over politics in his circle.
For example, the lion dance team represented the East Wing in the festive
parade of Jiangwang, a patron god of the Huang’s lineage who settled in
Village Z and Village Q. 
I attended the festive parade and celebration in 2006 (see Photo 2). On
the second day of the tenth month of the lunar calendar, the male villagers
of East Wing, West Wing, and Village Q took turns carrying the statue of
Jiangwang around the region they called “Jinshan,” an historic name for a
territory that encompasses several of the present administrative districts.
The rally not only visited sacred landmarks such as the Temple of Jiangwang,
ancestral halls, and the Zhixing Cultural Centre, but also the homes and en-
terprises of some “big shots” who were typically donors to the celebration
and to the office of the village committee. Along with spirits, deities, and
ancestors, influential businessmen as well as local cadres were anchored to
local places as guardians of the local ritual-political jurisdiction. 
The process of ritual re-territorialisation was organised with and perpet-
uated by male social bonding and a communal sense of belonging rather
than superstitious belief. After the rally, a big evening feast with singing and
dancing performances, free to all villagers, was held in the cultural centre.
The activities were shot through with communal solidarity, historical mem-
ory, and moral authority, constituting a space of minjian opposed to the ex-
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Photo 1 – Zhixing Cultural Centre.
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Photo 2 – The festive parade of Jiangwang.
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ertion of state power. (21) By the end of the feast, Yingbang, satisfied with all
the arrangements, remarked, “The show tonight is great and lively. This is
what we mean by having fun with the people. What is taken from the people
is used in the interests of the people. Forget about those official formalities.
I don’t want leaders’ [lingdao] boring speeches at all. Having a good time
with the people is the most important.”
Lineage solidarity and electoral struggles
There has been a proliferation of scholarship on the revival of lineage or-
ganisations and traditions vis-à-vis the higher orders of state power, espe-
cially in South China. (22) Sharing this observation, this study argues that the
resurgence of ritual space and communal organisations can be seen as a
popular movement for villagers to re-embody rural space and revolt against
proletarianisation. It is a retrieval of social space from the drives of the mod-
ernising state back to the bodily practices of place-making. These practices
re-activate the cyclical temporality of festival as well as the imagined spa-
tiality of lineage, local, and spiritual place, rather than an unchecked linear
progression featuring capitalist imperative, homogenisation of space, and
physical discipline. 
Lineage solidarity is not only staged and performed in rituals but also em-
bedded deeply in social organisations, including descent groups character-
istic of their place-bounded identities. Before the Chinese Communist Party
came to power, these were small kinship or descent groups, sharing the fam-
ily name “Huang” and claiming common respective descent. Villagers of the
same kinship groups, renamed “production teams” in the Mao era, lived in
the same neighbourhood and worshipped in their own ancestral hall sym-
bolically affiliated with the Zhixing Hall for generations. Mao’s collectivisa-
tion further strengthened their social relationships despite the name of
“production team.” Villagers of the same descent group worked together as
a production and labouring unit for almost 30 years. Since the 1980s, after
villagers quit farming, they were renamed “village groups,” primarily func-
tioning as residential clusters and basic interest groups as well. Heads of
village groups, elected by villagers, were in charge of collecting rent for their
agricultural land, although management was in the hands of the village
committee. Collective ownership was perceived by villagers as an entitle-
ment of not only the individual but also the descent group. Hence, the heads
of village groups played an important role in local disputes.
After township Party secretary Tang Binghua stepped down in 2003,
Huang Zhanji, one of Ganzhi’s associates, succeeded Ganzhi in the post of
village Party secretary. However Zhanji resigned very soon, and the party
organisation nominated Huang Zhenhe as village Party secretary in 2004.
Zhenhe, a villager as well as a descent group member born in the 1970s,
left the village for education in the 1980s, joined the Party while at univer-
sity in the 1990s, and worked as a factory manager for more than ten years
before he took office. He was regarded by villagers as an outsider and a
“puppet” controlled by Ganzhi’s associates. Villagers led by most descent
groups took this chance to challenge party-state authority. Instead of posing
physical challenges to the Party leadership, they decided to play it safe by
staging a protest outside an electronics factory and accusing its owner of
occupying their village land without compensation. Some even used a trac-
tor to push down the wall, and the township government sent a team of
riot police to disperse the crowd. They made their voices loud enough to be
heard by upper-level cadres, but without being confrontational toward the
government. 
In 2005, protest leaders Yuezhen and Zhikun were supported by villagers,
especially village heads, to run for election. Despite protests from villagers,
the Party secretary and township government refused to put their names
on the ballot in the first round. However more than 400 villagers used the
space provided on the ballots for “write-ins” (lingxuan taren) to support
them. As a result, Huang Zhiyuan and Huang Zhigang, Party members and
candidates selected by the Party, failed to gain more than half of the votes,
and another round of voting had to be held. In the second round, probably
in fear of protests and even riots, the township government agreed to put
Yuezhen and Zhikun’s names on the ballot. They finally won the election
with more than 700 votes and became chairperson and member of the vil-
lage committee, respectively. It was believed that the extra votes they
gained came from Yingbang, who encouraged villagers, especially members
and supporters of his lion dance team, to write in the name of Guilin, the
electricity station manager, in the first round. But Guilin announced his with-
drawal from the election in the second round and his votes went to Yuezhen
and Zhikun.
After the election, the land dispute continued with the conflict between
the Party secretary and village descent groups. Zhenhe proposed to sell
most of the remaining land to developers and to construct factory buildings
for rental on the rest. However, many villagers preferred to divide the land
among the village committee and village groups first and then develop the
plots of land. Huang Qiu, one of village group heads, used the logic of lineage
division to justify their proposal.
It doesn’t make sense to put all the land together. Division is normal.
It is just like a father with his grown-up sons. Division of land and
property is the rule. How could they live and work together? 
The village committee was portrayed as the father by villagers, who saw
themselves as his offspring, obedient yet entitled to a share of the family
property. The moral economy, (23) inspired by the metaphors of lineage,
branch (fenfang), and family, prevailed over any concept of socio-economic
justice and civil rights. Villagers succeeded in demanding distribution of the
annual revenue derived from agricultural land according to village groups
and temporarily halted the Party secretary’s project. Local solidary groups,
such as temple and lineage groups, provide informal institutions that hold
local authorities accountable for the public good. (24) But their power, con-
fined to the distribution of interests, proves to be a cellular form of resist-
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ance, not powerful enough to challenge the developmental state and its
economic project in the long run. 
Without much capital and experience in any business other than farming,
the village heads failed to attract capital outside the village and launch al-
ternative development projects, especially at a time when the investment
fever had passed in Dongguan. In 2006, the city and township governments
collaborated in offering a deal worth 90 million yuan to acquire all land lo-
cated in the south, the largest plot in the village. With reluctance, all village
groups agreed to this offer. As Huang Qiu, a village group head, explained,
while all villagers looked for economic development, the government’s pro-
posal was almost the only option. They were also afraid that if they rejected
this offer, the city government would expropriate their land with meagre
compensation in the name of public interest. Villagers were also happy to
receive 10,000 yuan per household as soon as the deal was done.
The electoral struggle and land dispute came at a moment when com-
munal control over land was becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. As
the procedures for land use changed and expropriation became more for-
malised and elaborate, and as the scale of development increased, it became
less and less feasible for villagers to reclaim the right to their land. The de-
volution of communal control over land put the regulation of land into the
hands of state cadres, who managed it in a legal yet more capitalist manner.
Village elections, as scholars of Chinese grassroots democracy argue, (25) not
only function as a zone in which local people seek political participation,
but also as the means by which one-party rule regains its legitimacy. The
case of Village Z confirms the finding that elections mitigate challenges to
Party rule and demonstrates that they also help restore the legitimacy of
state-led developmentalism and the urban process at the expense of strong
motivation to participate in village affairs. 
The collective action of villagers lacked sustaining power largely due to
the lack of an adaptive leadership, a factor identified by recent research. (26)
As the village dispute eventually calmed down, township cadres attempted
to pacify the dissidents by absorption and buyoff. Yuezhen’s chairpersonship
could not bring much change to the power structure of the village presided
over by the Party. When the next election came, Yuezhen decided not to
run for office, probably because he was offered a position in township gov-
ernment. After the right to develop village land was largely handed over to
the city and township governments, the controversy over several small plots
of land to be developed by the village government did not cause serious
conflicts anymore. Villagers lost all leverage for action, even though they
were disappointed with Yuezhen’s performance and the small dividend de-
rived from ground-rental income from factories. Without much challenge,
Zhiyuan, selected by the new township Party leadership again, won the seat
of village committee chairperson during the elections in 2008 and 2011 re-
spectively. Then Zhiyuan eventually replaced Zhenhe as Party branch sec-
retary.
Conclusion: Territorial struggle
Recent grassroots resistance in China, launched through litigation, the civic
action repertoire such as rallies and protests, and grassroots elections, has
drawn attention from the media and academics. (27) However, this portrayal,
informed by liberalist notions, does not pay sufficient attention to the post-
socialist context. The Mao era of collectivisation not only built up a Leninist
state-bureaucracy penetrating into the villages, but also consolidated a net-
work of nucleated villages with organised fields. The Cultural Revolution by
no means completely eliminated villagers’ folk religion or their territorial
imagination. Lineage ties in Guangdong, especially after decollectivisation,
reinforce their corporate character as the basic framework of resistance in
cellular form. (28) The “cellularisation of society” by state penetration, as Vivi-
enne Shue noted in the 1980s, continues to contain the growing number
and intensity of villagers’ struggles. (29) The sprouting of local sites of insur-
gency is so fragmented that it hardly constitutes a civic domain at the local
level, not to mention the national level.
The post-Mao states, central and local, harnessing the principles of capi-
talist development, seek to corrode these place-based identities as obstacles
to capital accumulation and state-sponsored urbanisation. (30) The states di-
vest villagers of direct power and duties immediately concerned with the
production and appropriation of land, leaving them to cultural and ritual
attachments to their imagined territories. This study contributes to the dis-
cussion on China’s state-led urbanisation and the rise of localities by high-
lighting the conflictual politico-economic process, experience of class
polarity, and proletarianisation. These have implications for cultural politics
in the sense that communal-territorial imagination and contestation soar
in the midst of proletarianisation and people’s struggles against it. It is a
socio-spatial struggle over “the collective” rather than a smooth market
transition. In sum, the contestation over urban spaces involves the re-en-
chantment of communal territories and the emergence of the local state
at the village, township, and city levels, with the public character of an urban
growth machine. 
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